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Monitoring school performance using value-
added and value-table models: Lessons from the 
UK 
George Leckie 
Abstract Since 1992, the UK Government has published so-called ‘school league 
tables’ summarizing the average attainment and progress made by pupils in each state-
funded secondary school in England. In this article, we statistically critique and 
compare prominent past, current and forthcoming value-added and value-table 
measures of school performance. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the 
different measures as well as their underlying statistical models. 
Abstract Abstract in Italian 
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1 Introduction 
The UK has a long history of publishing ‘school league tables’ summarising 
pupils’ examination and test results. Over time, increasingly sophisticated measures 
have been introduced culminating in 2006 with contextual value-added (CVA), a 
multilevel modelling ‘value-added’ based approach. However, in 2011 the 
Government withdrew CVA replacing it with expected progress (EP), a simpler 
‘value-table’ approach. In this paper we: question the Government’s reasons for 
withdrawing CVA; we argue that EP suffers from serious design flaws; and we show 
that CVA and EP lead to very different rankings and therefore that choice of school 
performance measure has very important ramifications for school accountability. 
                                                          
1 George Leckie, Centre for Multilevel Modelling and Graduate School of Education, University 
of Bristol, UK; email: g.leckie@bristol.ac.uk  
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2 Background to national tests, school performance measures 
and school league tables in England 
The English education system consists of a primary phase of education (ages 4–
11, years R–6) followed by a secondary phase of education (ages 11–16, years 7–11). 
Effectively all pupils change schools at the transition between the two phases. At the 
end of primary schooling, all pupils sit national Key Stage 2 (KS2) tests in English 
and maths. These are measured using continuous point scores, but are discretised into 
levels for reporting purposes: W (working below level 1), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. At the end of 
secondary schooling, all pupils sit national GCSE examinations in English, 
mathematics as well as in a range of other subjects of their choosing. Attainment in 
each subject is measured using GCSE grades: U, G, F, E, D, C, B, A, A*. School 
league tables are then constructed summarising schools’ performances in these KS2 
tests and GCSE examinations (http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/). 
Our focus is on secondary school performance measures and therefore schools’ GCSE 
performances, and especially the average progress made by pupils in each school 
during secondary schooling between their KS2 tests and their GCSE examinations. 
The Government gives three main justifications for publishing school league 
tables. First school league tables are published to support parental school choice based 
on schools’ ability to teach the national curriculum, and to therefore create 
competition and a free market in education (Education Reform act 1988). An 
important element of this first argument is that the tables are routinely republished by 
the media and so have a very high national profile. Second, they are published to 
enable school accountability; publically funded schools should be held publically 
accountable. Indeed, Ofsted, the official schools’ inspectorate system in part choose 
which schools to inspect on the basis of schools’ league table results. Schools whose 
results do not improve face takeover by neighbouring schools or ultimately closure. 
Third, they are published to promote school improvement via school self-reflection 
and the identification of effective practices being employed in successful schools. 
Indeed, a number of commercial and charitable companies now sell to schools pupil 
performance monitoring software and other services based on the same data which 
underlies the Government’s tables. 
An important distinction to be made is between ‘attainment’ and ‘progress’ school 
performance measures. Attainment measures aim to report the average ‘status’ of 
pupils at the end of secondary schooling. The headline attainment measure in England 
for effectively the last 20 years has been the percentage of pupils achieving 5 or more 
A*-C GCSE grades (5 A*-C). Attainment measures may give useful information 
regarding school inequalities, but it is crucial to realise that in England and other 
education systems more generally they reflect differences in school intake 
composition more than school processes. In contrast, progress measures (e.g., CVA 
and EP) aim to report the average ‘growth’ or ‘improvement’ made by pupils during 
secondary schooling. Progress measures are generally considered the fairer and more 
meaningful way to measure school performance for school choice, accountability and 
improvement purposes. 
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Table 1 reports various performance measures for schools in Bristol in 2010 and 
should be referred back to as we discuss the various measures in more detail below. 
 
Table 1: City of Bristol 2010 school league table. 
School n 5 A*-C CVA CVA 
lower 
CVA 
upper 
EP 
English 
EP 
maths 
Ashton Park School 180 49 1003 994 1013 66 70 
Bedminster Down School  191 40 989 979 998 74 48 
Bridge Learning Campus 
- Secondary  
145 34 1003 993 1014 64 44 
Brislington Enterprise 
College 
216 37 970 962 979 60 40 
Bristol Brunel Academy  158 45 1005 994 1016 69 62 
Bristol Cathedral Choir 
School  
75 75 1002 987 1017 95 77 
Bristol Metropolitan 
Academy  
127 39 1011 999 1023 76 61 
The City Academy Bristol  183 36 1036 1027 1046 71 49 
Colston's Girls' School  68 91 1010 992 1027 100 90 
Cotham School 180 77 1016 1006 1026 86 85 
Fairfield High School  194 49 1004 994 1014 73 63 
Henbury School 161 39 1001 991 1011 66 54 
Merchants' Academy 124 25 1010 998 1021 56 26 
Oasis Academy 
Brightstowe  
93 29 1028 1015 1041 62 37 
Oasis Academy Bristol  115 29 1007 995 1019 56 36 
Orchard School 172 37 1005 995 1015 69 51 
St Bede's Catholic 
College  
185 72 1006 996 1016 80 71 
St Bernadette Catholic 
Secondary School 
152 37 980 969 990 66 47 
St Mary Redcliffe and 
Temple School  
207 70 1013 1004 1022 86 75 
Notes: Table reproduced from 
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/archive/schools_10/pdf_10/801.pdf. n = number of 
pupils at the end of GCSE; 5 A*-C = Percentage of pupils with five or more GCSEs (or equivalent 
qualifications) at grade A* to C; CVA = Contextual value-added score (national average = 1000); CVA 
lower = Lower limit of CVA 95% confidence interval; CVA lower = Upper limit of CVA 95% confidence 
interval; EP English = Percentage of pupils making expected progress in English; EP English = Percentage 
of pupils making expected progress in mathematics. 
3 Contextual value-added (2006-2010) 
The Government’s CVA measure is based on the standard approach to modelling 
value-added in the school-effectiveness literature which is to fit a two-level pupil-
within-schools random-intercept model to pupils’ final attainment adjusting for pupil 
prior attainment and other pupil socioeconomic and demographic characteristics 
(Goldstein, 2011). The reported CVA scores are simply the empirical Bayes predicted 
school random effects. These scores are presented with 95% confidence intervals to 
communicate their statistical uncertainty. Conceptually, CVA scores and value-added 
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scores more generally can be viewed as school-level averages of the differences 
between pupils’ actual and predicted GCSE scores. A simplified version of the CVA 
model can be written as  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗  (1) 
 
where 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗  denotes the GCSE score of pupil 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑗) in school 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽)  
 𝑥𝑖𝑗  denotes their KS2 score 
 𝑧𝑖𝑗  denotes their free school mean status 
 𝑢𝑗 denotes their school’s value-added effect or CVA score 
 𝑒𝑖𝑗 denotes the pupil residual 
 
The full model enters KS2 score as a flexible polynomial and includes a much wider 
range of pupil socioeconomic and demographic characteristics including pupil age, 
gender, ethnicity, special education needs status and residential deprivation score. The 
GCSE score is summed over pupils’ best eight GCSE results, while their KS2 score 
is averaged across their separate results for English and mathematics. 
3.1 The Government’s justifications for withdrawing CVA 
The government withdrew CVA in 2010 citing a number of justifications (DfE, 2010). 
First they argued that ‘[CVA] is difficult for the public to understand’. Clearly CVA 
is more complex than simply reporting school average exam scores. However, the 
notion of making adjustments for differences in schools’ student compositions in 
terms of their prior attainment and other factors isn’t in itself intrinsically difficult to 
understand. There is no need for the public to understand the statistical details of the 
model in order to interpret the adjusted school-mean scores. Perhaps the real problem 
is that the Government did not do enough to explain and communicate CVA? For 
example, one had to delve deep into the technical documentation to find out what the 
CVA unit of measurement was. Clearly the notion of 95% confidence intervals is also 
hard for the public to understand, however perhaps the Government should have 
explored various graphical approaches for communicating statistical uncertainty 
rather than simply reporting the confidence intervals in tabular form (Leckie and 
Goldstein, 2011; Leckie et al., 2016). It is also worth noting that the methodology 
underlying CVA is the same as that used in Hong Kong (Schools Value-added 
Information System, SVAIS) and simpler than that underlying other school 
performance measures published around the world (e.g., Tennessee’s e Value-Added 
Assessment System, TVAAS, or Australia’s similar schools methodology). 
 
The Government’s second reason for ending CVA was that ‘recent research shows 
[CVA] to be a less strong predictor of success than raw attainment measures’. It is not 
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entirely clear what the Government are trying to say here (they don’t cite the research 
they refer to). It sounds like they are saying that a pupil’s GCSE score is more strongly 
predicted by their KS2 score than by their school’s CVA score. However, predicting 
GCSE success was never the aim of CVA; the aim was to measure the effects schools 
actually had on their pupils. 
 
The Government’s third reason for ending CVA was that ‘[CVA] also has the effect 
of expecting different levels of progress from different groups of pupils on the basis 
of their ethnic background, or family circumstances, which we think is wrong in 
principle’. However, CVA did not apriori expect different levels of progress from 
different pupil groups, rather it adjusted for such differences if they arose. The reality 
is that some pupil groups do make less progress than others and that this must be 
adjusted for if we are to make fair comparisons between schools. Failure to do so leads 
to ‘comparing apples and oranges’ 
 
Expanding on this theme, the Government argue that ‘It is morally wrong to have an 
attainment measure which entrenches low aspirations for children because of their 
background’. The Government are arguing that by adjusting for pupil background, 
CVA led to a system-level acceptance that socially and other disadvantaged pupil 
groups will make less progress than their more advantage peers. Although not stated 
explicitly, the real concern appears to be that some schools started to use the published 
CVA model to set differential GCSE targets for current pupils based on their 
background. This was never the purpose of CVA and reflects the perverse incentives 
that so often arise with high-stakes school league tables. 
 
Finally, the Government argued that ‘We should expect every child to succeed and 
measure schools on how much value they add for all pupils, not rank them on the 
ethnic make-up of their intake...’. This statement suggests a fundamental 
misunderstanding. CVA explicitly adjusted for as many of the observed differences 
between schools’ intakes as possible in order to remove their influence from schools’ 
rankings. In contrast, it is when one ignores these differences that one implicitly ranks 
schools on the make-up of their intakes. 
4 Expected progress (2011-2015) 
The Government’s Expected Progress (EP) measures is based on value-table 
methodology (Castellano and Ho, 2013). EP is published separately for English and 
mathematics. EP is calculated simply as the percentage of pupils making three levels 
of progress between KS2 and GCSE; it ignores pupils’ socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. The Government’s introduction of EP can be seen as an 
explicit attempt to address the flaws they perceived in CVA. Specifically, EP is 
designed to be both easy for the public to understand and blind to all differences 
between schools’ intakes other than their prior attainment. 
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Every pupil is effectively set a target GCSE grade in English and separately in 
mathematics as a function of their KS2 levels in those subjects. Table 2 presents this 
idea in tabular form. Thus, for example, low prior attainers (those who achieved KS2 
level 3) are expected to achieve a D GCSE grade or higher, while middle prior 
attainers (KS2 level 4) are expected to achieve a C or higher, and high prior attainers 
(KS2 level 5) are expected to achieve a B or higher. Essentially, all pupils are expected 
to progress by 3 (or more) levels during the five year duration of secondary schooling. 
 
Table 2: Table showing how expected progress in English and mathematics is calculated. 
KS2 level GCSE target grade / level 
? U G F  E  D C B A  A* 
? 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
? No No ? ? ? ? ? Yes Yes Yes 
W No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1 No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4 No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: W = Working towards level 1; ? = No result; No = EP not made; Yes = EP made. Table reproduced 
from Department for Education (2015a). 
 
We can write this value-table model for English (or equally for mathematics) as 
 
 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗 = I(𝑦𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖𝑗 ≥ 3),          𝐸𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ .𝑗 =
1
𝑛𝑗
∑ 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
 (2) 
 
where 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 denotes the GCSE level associated with the English grade of pupil 𝑖 (𝑖 =
1, … , 𝑛𝑗) in school 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗  denotes their English KS2 level 
 𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑗  denotes whether they made expected progress in English (i.e., 3 or more 
levels of progress) 
 𝐸𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ .𝑗 denotes the school proportion of pupils making expected progress in 
English 
 
An important aspect of EP is its role in national ‘floor standards’ introduced by the 
Government also in 2011. A school is judged ‘underperforming’ if less than 40% of 
pupils achieve 5 A*-C, but is exempted if they are in the top half nationally in EP in 
both English and mathematics. Thus, EP is meant to play a central balancing role in 
these judgements. Schools judged underperforming face increased scrutiny from 
Ofsted, potential takeover by neighbouring schools, or even closure. 
4.1 Statistical concerns with expected progress 
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Our first statistical concern with EP is that it will bring about perverse incentives 
whereby schools concentrate their efforts on those pupils who are borderline in terms 
of potentially making EP (i.e., those pupils operating just below the No/Yes boundary 
in Table 2). This perverse incentive is largely driven by the fact that the transition 
values of the value table are binary (EP is a threshold measure). There are no partial 
rewards for just missing target grades; no additional rewards for surpassing target 
grades.  
 
Our second statistical concern with EP is that, nationally, there is a strong dependency 
on prior attainment. Figure 1 shows that the national percentage of pupils making EP 
increases sharply with KS2 level (we have restricted the plot to KS2 levels 3, 4 and 5 
as these account for the vast majority of pupils, over 95%). Thus, it is harder for low 
prior attainers to make expected progress than it is for high prior attainers. Low prior 
attainers are set relatively tough target GCSE grades while high prior attainers are set 
relatively easy target GCSE grades. Schools with higher prior attaining intakes will 
therefore do better on EP. EP therefore under-adjusts for school differences in prior 
attainment. EP is not a pure measure of progress in the way that CVA is. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: National percentage of pupils making EP (expected progress) during secondary schooling 
against KS2 levels (3, 4 and 5) in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics. 
 
A related concern reveals itself when we inspect the relationship between the national 
percentage making EP and the underlying continuous prior attainment score in each 
subject. Figure 2 plots a scatterplot of this relationship where the size of the plotted 
points is proportional to the number of students with each KS2 score. First note that 
the overall positive association between the percentage of pupils making EP and their 
prior attainment is revealed to be even stronger than before. For example, in maths, 
the percentage of pupils making their target GCSE grade ranges from below 20% to 
above 80% as we move from the lowest to the highest KS2 scores. However, in 
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contrast to Figure 1, we now also see that EP has an illogical sawtooth (zig zag) 
dependency on prior attainment with sharp discontinuities in the probability of making 
EP as we move from the top of one KS2 level to the bottom of the next. Thus, with 
this approach, pupils will effectively the same prior attainment are set very different 
educational challenges in terms of their target grades. This is clearly undesirable. 
 
 
Figure 2: National percentage of pupils making EP (expected progress) during secondary schooling 
against KS2 score in 2014, reported separately for English and mathematics. The magnitude of the hollow 
circles are proportional to the national number of pupils with that KS2 score. The dashed vertical lines 
denote the KS2 level thresholds. Level W = working towards level 1. For clarity, the plot is restricted to 
values of KS2 score for which there were at least 100 pupils nationally. 
 
Our third statistical concern is that EP takes no account of pupils’ socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics and therefore will be biased in favour of schools which 
serve more advantaged pupil groups. 
 
Our fourth statistical concern with EP is that it makes no attempt to quantify and 
communicate the statistical uncertainty in measuring school effects. There is no 
obvious way for users to establish whether measured differences between schools, or 
differences from national averages and floor standards, are meaningful, or whether 
they more likely reflect the variations of chance. Consider a school with 180 pupils 
where 70% make EP. The associated 95% Wald binomial confidence interval ranges 
from 63% to 77% and so the school has a ±7 percentage point margin of error which 
would be completely unacceptable in any survey or poll of public opinion. When we 
plot the 95% confidence interval for every school in the country (Figure 3), we see 
that over a third of schools cannot be distinguished from the national average in either 
English or mathematics. 
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Figure 3: EP (expected progress) scores in 2014 with 95% Wald binomial confidence intervals presented 
in rank order of magnitude, reported separately for English and mathematics. Higher ranks denote higher 
performances. The horizontal lines denote the national average EP scores. The confidence intervals are 
approximate hence the upper bounds exceeding a value of 100 for a minority of schools with 
exceptionally high EP scores. For clarity, the plot shows every 20th school. 
5 Expected progress vs. Contextual value-added 
We have explained how CVA and EP, based on value-added and value-table 
methodologies, are fundamentally different measures of school progress. However, if 
the two measures lead to similar rankings then it could be argued that our arguments 
are largely academic. In this section we therefore analyse the 2010 data (3,056 
schools) to contrast the two methods of calculating school progress empirically. 
 
Table 3 reports Pearson correlations between the CVA, EP, 5 A*-C and KS2 APS 
(average point score across English and maths). We see that CVA and EP are only 
moderately positively correlated (correlations of 0.36 and 0.29 between CVA and EP 
in English and maths). EP is much more highly correlated with 5 A*-C (correlations 
of 0.85 and 0.89) and is therefore closer to being a pure attainment measure of school 
performance than a pure progress measure. This is supported by the high correlations 
between EP & KS2 APS (correlations of 0.64 and 0.67), whereas there is effectively 
no relationship between CVA & KS2 APS (correlation of -0.02); a schools’ success 
in EP is very much predetermined by how academic their students are at intake. 
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Table 3: Pearson correlations between 5 A*-C, CVA, and EP in English and mathematics in 2010.  
 5 A*-C CVA EP English EP maths KS2 APS 
5 A*-C 1     
CVA 0.24 1    
EP English 0.85 0.36 1   
EP maths 0.89 0.29 0.77 1  
KS2 APS 0.87 -0.02 0.64 0.67 1 
Notes: Number of schools = 3,056. 5 A*-C = Percentage of pupils with five or more GCSEs (or equivalent 
qualifications) at grade A* to C; CVA = Contextual value-added score; EP English = Percentage of pupils 
making expected progress in English; EP English = Percentage of pupils making expected progress in 
mathematics; KS2 APS = KS2 average point score. 
 
Plotting schools’ CVA ranks against their EP ranks (Figure 4) starkly reveals that 
many schools ranked high on EP are ranked low on CVA and vice versa. The two 
measure are clearly measuring very different things. 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatterplot of school CVA ranks against EP ranks, based on 2010 school league table data, 
reported separately for English and mathematics. Higher ranks denote higher performances. 
 
An interesting exercise is to consider how schools’ ranks would likely change were 
the Government to revert back from EP to CVA and in particular, what types of 
schools would benefit or not by such a move. We plot the change in national rank 
against school mean KS2 APS (Figure 5). As expected, EP is strongly biased in favour 
of schools with high prior attaining intakes: schools with high prior attainming intakes 
would see very large drops in their national ranking were the Government to switch 
back from EP to CVA. The distinct cluster of schools which would particularly lose 
out with a return to CVA are ‘grammar’ schools, a small subset of around 160 schools 
which select pupils academically at intake and therefore have especially high school 
mean prior attainment. In grammar school areas, ‘secondary modern’ schools take the 
remaining pupils and so these schools therefore have especially low mean prior 
attainment. The point, however, is a more general one which is that CVA and EP are 
quite different school performance measures leading to substantially different 
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rankings which will be systematically biased in favour or against particular types of 
schools. 
 
 
Figure 5: Difference between school CVA and EP ranks against school mean KS2 average point score, 
based on 2010 school league table data, reported separately for English and mathematics. KS2 levels map 
onto the KS2 point score scale as follows: [18,24) = KS2 level 3 (i.e., low prior attainers); [24,30) = 
KS2 level 4 (i.e., middle prior attainers); [30,36) = KS2 level 5 (i.e., high prior attainers). 
 
Recall the Government’s floor standards and that since 2011 a school is judged 
‘underperforming’ if less than 40% of pupils achieve 5 A*-C, but is exempted if they 
are in the top half nationally in EP in both English and mathematics. In 2010, 464 
schools (15%) were judged underperforming, a further 37 schools were excused due 
to outperforming the national median school in EP in English and mathematics. These 
figures drop to 303 schools (10%) with a further 198 schools now being excused when 
we use CVA in place of EP. What these simple statistics inform us is that the purported 
‘balancing role’ played by EP is undermined by EP being much closer to a pure 
attainment measure rather than a pure progress measure In contrast, CVA would have 
done a far better job in contextualizing schools’ performances with respect to their 
different student compositions. 
6 Progress 8 
In 2016, the Government will withdraw EP replacing it with P8, a new value-added 
based measure derived from a multiple linear regression model, a simplified version 
of which can be written as 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝑟𝑖𝑗 ,          ?̂?∙𝑗 =
1
𝑛𝑗
∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
 (3) 
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where 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗  denotes the GCSE score of pupil 𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛𝑗) in school 𝑗 (𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽) 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗  denotes their KS2 score 
 𝑟𝑖𝑗  denotes the pupil residual 
 ?̂?∙𝑗 denotes the predicted school value-added effect 
 
P8 will adjust for a flexible function of pupil prior attainment (𝑥𝑖𝑗) and so should avoid 
the borderline effects and biases of EP. P8 scores (?̂?∙𝑗) will also once again be 
presented with 95% confidence intervals and therefore avoid that criticism of EP. 
However, P8 will continue to ignore school differences in the socioeconomic and 
demographic composition of their pupils. 
 
P8 will also replace EP in the Government’s floor standards. A school will now be 
judge underperforming if its pupils score on average half a grade lower than predicted 
and if this difference is statistically significant. Thus, the new floor standards will 
entirely be based on the new progress measure and statistical noise involved in these 
calculations will now be taken into account. These changes represent a substantial 
improvement on the Government’s previous floor standards. 
7 Conclusion 
The UK Government’s reasons for withdrawing CVA, a value-added based measure, 
are questionable. CVA’s successor, EP, a value-table based measure, appears 
fundamentally flawed. In particular, EP perversely incentivises schools’ efforts on 
borderline pupils, it is severely dependent on prior attainment, it ignores school 
differences in pupils’ backgrounds, and it fails to communicate statistical uncertainty. 
CVA, while by no means perfect, largely avoided these pitfalls. P8 is conceptually a 
return to the value-added based approach of CVA and should therefore also avoid 
these pitfalls, however, it will continue to ignore pupils’ socioeconomic and 
demographic backgrounds and we think this fundamentally problematic in terms of 
holding schools accountable.  
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